Twenty Years After the Fall

By George Friedman

We are now at the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. We are also nearing the 18th anniversary of the fall of the Soviet Union itself. This is more than simply a moment for reflection — it is a moment to consider the current state of the region and of Russia versus that whose passing we are now commemorating. To do that, we must re-examine why the Soviet empire collapsed, and the current status of the same forces that caused that collapse.

Russia’s Two-Part Foundation

The Russian empire — both the Czarist and Communist versions — was a vast, multinational entity. At its greatest extent, it stretched into the heart of Central Europe; at other times, it was smaller. But it was always an empire whose constituent parts were diverse, hostile to each other and restless. Two things tied the empire together.

One was economic backwardness. Economic backwardness gave the constituent parts a single common characteristic and interest. None of them could effectively compete with the more dynamic economies of Western Europe and the rest of the world, but each could find a niche within the empire. Economic interests thus bound each part to the rest: They needed a wall to protect themselves from Western interests, and an arena in which their own economic interests, however stunted, could be protected. The empire provided that space and that opportunity.

The second thing tying the empire together was the power of the security apparatus. Where economic interest was insufficient to hold the constituent parts together, the apparatus held the structure together. In a vast empire with poor transportation and communication, the security apparatus — from Czarist times to the Soviet period — was the single unifying institution. It unified in the sense that it could compel what economic interest couldn’t motivate. The most sophisticated part of the Russian state was the security services. They were provided with the resources they needed to control the empire, report status to the center and impose the center’s decisions through terror, or more frequently, through the mere knowledge that terror would be the consequence of disobedience.

It was therefore no surprise that it was the security apparatus of the Soviet Union — the KGB under Yuri Andropov — which first recognized in the early 1980s that the Soviet Union’s economy not only was slipping further and further behind the West, but that its internal cohesion was threatened because the economy was performing so poorly that the minimal needs of the constituent parts were no longer being fulfilled.

In Andropov’s mind, the imposition of even greater terror, like Josef Stalin had applied, would not solve the underlying problem. Thus, the two elements holding the Soviet Union together were no longer working. The self-enclosed economy was failing and the security apparatus could not hold the system together.

It is vital to remember that in Russia, domestic economic health and national power do not go hand in hand. Russia historically has had a dysfunctional economy. By contrast, its military power has always been disproportionately strong. During World War II, the Soviets crushed the Wehrmacht in spite of their extraordinary economic weakness. Later, during the Cold War, they challenged and sometimes even beat the United States despite an incomparably weaker economy. The Russian security apparatus made this possible. Russia could devote far more of its economy to military power than other countries could because Moscow could control its population successfully. It could impose far greater austerities than other countries could. Therefore, Russia was a major power in spite of its economic weakness. And this gave it room to maneuver in an unexpected way.

Andropov’s Gamble

Andropov proposed a strategy he knew was risky, but which he saw as unavoidable. One element involved a dramatic restructuring of the Soviet economy and society to enhance efficiency. The second involved increased openness, not just domestically to facilitate innovation, but also in foreign affairs. Enclosure was no longer working: The Soviet Union needed foreign capital and investment to make restructuring work.

Andropov knew that the West, and particularly the United States, would not provide help so long as the Soviet Union threatened its geopolitical interests even if doing so would be economically profitable. For this opening to the West to work, the Soviet Union needed to reduce Cold War tensions dramatically. In effect, the Soviets needed to trade geopolitical interests to secure their economic interests. Since securing economic interests was essential for Communist Party survival, Andropov was proposing to follow the lead of Vladimir Lenin, another leader who sacrificed space for time. In the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that ended Russian participation in World War I, Lenin had conceded vast amounts of territory to Germany to buy time for the regime to consolidate itself. Andropov was suggesting the same thing.

It is essential to understand that Andropov was a Party man and a Chekist — a Communist and KGBer — through and through. He was not proposing the dismantling of the Party; rather, he sought to preserve the Party by executing a strategic retreat on the geopolitical front while the Soviet Union regained its economic balance. Undoubtedly he understood the risk that restructuring and openness would create enormous pressures at a time of economic hardship, possibly causing regime collapse under the strain. Andropov clearly thought the risk was worth running.

After Leonid Brezhnev died, Andropov took his place. He became ill almost immediately and died. He was replaced by Konstantin Chernenko, who died within a year. Then came Mikhail Gorbachev — the true heir to Andropov’s thinking — who implemented Andropov’s two principles. He pursued openness, or glasnost. He also pursued restructuring, or perestroika. He traded geopolitical interests, hard-won by the Red Army, for economic benefits. Contrary to his reputation in the West, Gorbachev was no liberal. He actually sought to preserve the Communist Party, and was prepared to restructure and open the system to do so.

As the security apparatus loosened its grip to facilitate openness and restructuring, the empire’s underlying tensions quickly went on display. When unrest in East Germany threatened to undermine Soviet control, Gorbachev had to make a strategic decision. If he used military force to suppress the uprising, probably restructuring and certainly openness would be dead, and the crisis Andropov foresaw would be upon him. Following Lenin’s principle, Gorbachev decided to trade space for time, and he accepted retreat from East Germany to maintain and strengthen his economic relations with the West.

After Gorbachev made that decision, the rest followed. If Germany were not to be defended, what would be defended? Applying his strategy rigorously, Gorbachev allowed the unwinding of the Eastern European empire without intervention. The decision he had made about Germany amounted to relinquishing most of Moscow’s World War II gains. But if regime survival required it, the price had to be paid.

The Crisis

The crisis came very simply. The degree of restructuring required to prevent the Soviet Union’s constituent republics from having an overarching interest in economic relations with the West rather than with Russia was enormous. There was no way to achieve it quickly. Given that the Soviet Union now had an official policy of ending its self-imposed enclosure, the apparent advantages to the constituent parts of protecting their economies from Western competition declined — and with them, the rationale for the Soviet Union. The security apparatus, the KGB, had been the engine driving glasnost and perestroika from the beginning; the advocates of the plan were not going to shift into reverse and suppress glasnost. But glasnost overwhelmed the system. The Soviet Union, unable to buy the time it needed to protect the Party, imploded. It broke apart into its constituent republics, and even parts of the Russian Federation seemed likely to break away.

What followed was liberalization only in the eyes of Westerners. It is easy to confuse liberalism with collapse, since both provide openness. But the former Soviet Union (FSU) wasn’t liberalizing, it was collapsing in every sense. What remained administratively was the KGB, now without a mission. The KGB was the most sophisticated part of the Soviet apparatus, and its members were the best and brightest. As privatization went into action, absent clear rules or principles, KGB members had the knowledge and sophistication to take advantage of it. As individuals and in factions, they built structures and relationships to take advantage of privatization, forming the factions that dominated the FSU throughout the 1990s until today. It is not reasonable to refer to organized crime in Russia, because Russia was lawless. In fact, the law enforcement apparatus was at the forefront of exploiting the chaos. Organized crime, business and the KGB became interconnected, and frequently identical.

The 1990s were a catastrophic period for most Russians. The economy collapsed. Property was appropriated in a systematic looting of all of the former Russian republics, with Western interests also rushing in to do quick deals on tremendously favorable terms. The new economic interests crossed the new national borders. (It is important to bear in mind that the boundaries that had separated Soviet republics were very real.) The financial cartels, named for the oligarchs who putatively controlled them (control was much more complex; many oligarchs were front men for more powerful and discreet figures), spread beyond the borders of the countries in which they originated, although the Russian cartels spread the most effectively.

Had the West — more specifically the United States — wanted to finish Russia off, this was the time. Russia had no effective government, poverty was extraordinary, the army was broken and the KGB was in a civil war over property. Very little pressure could well have finished off the Russian Federation.

The Bush and Clinton administrations made a strategic decision to treat Russia as the successor regime of the FSU, however, and refused to destabilize it further. Washington played an aggressive role in expanding NATO, but it did not try to break up the Russian Federation for several reasons. First, it feared nuclear weapons would fall into the hands of dangerous factions. Second, it did not imagine that Russia could ever be a viable country again. And third, it believed that if Russia did become viable, it would be a liberal democracy. (The idea that liberal democracies never threaten other liberal democracies was implanted in American minds.) What later became known as a neoconservative doctrine actually lay at the heart of the Clinton administration’s thinking.

Russia Regroups — and Faces the Same Crisis

Russia’s heart was the security apparatus. Whether holding it together or tearing it apart, the KGB — renamed the FSB after the Soviet collapse — remained the single viable part of the Russian state. It was therefore logical that when it became essential to end the chaos, the FSB would be the one to end it. Vladimir Putin, whom the KGB trained during Andropov’s tenure and who participated in the privatization frenzy in St. Petersburg, emerged as the force to recentralize Russia. The FSB realized that the Russian Federation itself faced collapse, and that excessive power had fallen out of its hands as FSB operatives had fought one another during the period of privatization.

Putin sought to restore the center in two ways. First, he worked to restore the central apparatus of the state. Second, he worked to strip power from oligarchs unaligned with the apparatus. It was a slow process, requiring infinite care so that the FSB not start tearing itself apart again, but Putin is a patient and careful man.

Putin realized that Andropov’s gamble had failed catastrophically. He also knew that the process could not simply be reversed; there was no going back to the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was possible to go back to the basic principles of the Soviet Union. First, there could be a union of the region, bound together by both economic weakness and the advantage of natural resource collaboration. Second, there was the reality of a transnational intelligence apparatus that could both stabilize the region and create the infrastructure for military power. And third, there was the reversal of the policy of trading geopolitical interests for financial benefits from the West. Putin’s view — and the average Russian’s view — was that the financial benefits of the West were more harmful than beneficial.

By 2008, when Russia defeated America’s ally, Georgia, in a war, the process of reassertion was well under way. Then, the financial crisis struck along with fluctuations in energy prices. The disparity between Russia’s politico-military aspirations, its military capability and its economic structure re-emerged. The Russians once again faced their classic situation: If they abandoned geopolitical interests, they would be physically at risk. But if they pursued their geopolitical interests, they would need a military force capable of assuming the task. Expanding the military would make the public unhappy as it would see resources diverted from public consumption to military production, and this could only be managed by increasing the power of the state and the security apparatus to manage the unhappiness. But this still left the risk of a massive divergence between military and economic power that could not be bridged by repression. This risk re-created the situation that emerged in the 1970s, had to be dealt with in the 1980s and turned into chaos in the 1990s.

The current decisions the Russians face can only be understood in the context of events that transpired 20 years ago. The same issues are being played out, and the generation that now governs Russia was forged in that crucible. The Russian leadership is trying to balance the possible outcomes to find a solution. They cannot trade national security for promised economic benefits that may not materialize or may not be usable. And they cannot simply use the security apparatus to manage increased military spending — there are limits to that.

As a generation ago, Russia is caught between the things that it must do to survive in the short run and the things it cannot do if they are to survive in the long run. There is no permanent solution for Russia, and that is what makes it such an unpredictable player in the international system. The closest Russia has come to a stable solution to its strategic problem was under Ivan the Terrible and Stalin, and even those could not hold for more than a generation.

The West must understand that Russia is never at peace with itself internally, and is therefore constantly shifting its external relationships in an endless, spasmodic cycle. Things go along for awhile, and then suddenly change. We saw a massive change 20 years ago, but the forces that generated that change had built up quietly in the generation before. The generation since has been trying to pull the pieces back together. But in Russia, every solution is merely the preface to the next problem — something built into the Russian reality.

Published in Stratfor.com

A Dignified President For A European Romania

A Dignified President For A European Romania. Open Letter To The Civil Society

Events over the past few months have shown an accelerated degradation of the authority of all institutions and the appearance of a climate of confusion, vulgarity and violence in the entire society. Given that there are increasingly fewer chances for the solution to be provided by the political class, a reaction of the democratic intelligentsia and of the civil society as a whole becomes imperative.

A good opportunity is presented by the presidential elections of 2009, which represent a novum of romanian politics in two ways: first presidential elections since Romania has joined the EU and the dissociated presidential race form the parliamentary elections, with which they had been associated in the previous five electoral cycles.

We would have expected, under the circumstances, for the public debate to focus on determining the profile of the romanian european head of state. His fundamental characteristics – whether he is a constitutional monarch not subjected to popular vote, a president elected by the parliament or a president elected through direct vote – are the capacity to act like an political referee between the institutions or between the state and the society and the capacity to intervene in crisis situations based on a moral prestige preserved by self-imposed discretion in times of normality.

Given the current level of information availability, we know well that, excepting the semi-presidential French Republic which offers the President a different status, the heads of state elsewhere in Europe really do correspond to this profile, which they tacitly respect.

The president’s election through direct vote in states such as Austria, Finland or Portugal, whose history has witnessed periods not dissimilar to our own, has merely spared the President of these countries of the pressure exerted by political machinations in Parliament and has by no means justified his meddling in the Government’s, the Parliament’s or Justice’s activity in virtue of a popular mandate.

Even in Poland, Slovenia of Lithuania, countries which have experienced the communist dictatorship, things are no different. How does one explain, then, the persistence in our country of the myth of the “player-President” and more importantly, the fact that a significant percentage of the population approves the attitude of a president whose behaviour has often resembled that of a populist and demagogue head of state in an authoritarian Third World country?

The fact that in Romania – due to the democratic mechanisms which continue to function in spite of difficulties and to the extraordinary resilience of mass-media – a slide back into totalitarianism does not appear as a credible possibility is not an excuse, but rather an even more forceful accusation of the democratic consciousness deficit one may notice in the mentality of a large segment of the electorate and even of certain opinion leaders.

I believe this difference in the perception of the President’s role and desired profile between the EU and Romania is an issue inviting meditation; we ought to identify the ways to prevent electoral shows from turning into “Who wants to be a millionaire?” entertainment show dotted with poor jokes and impose a serious debate about the constitutional role of the President.

Had the civil society shown, since 2000, when the European path of Romania had become a certainty, the will to present before the public opinion the European model of the Head of State and the strength to convince the electorate, things would have been very different in today’s Romania. Unfortunately, part of the intellectual elite has instead opted for the “saviour leader” model, anachronistic not only in Europe, but also in terms of our own constitutional construction.

Incapable of taking personal political, social and even intellectual responsibility and conceive a national project, these intellectuals have transferred their impotence to the whole nation, because an authoritarian leader in a democracy is nothing but the ratification, through popular vote, of a general humiliation. The current moral misery in the Romanian society has propagated thus on a top-bottom trajectory and has been caused by the fact that a significant segment of the public opinion has accepted years ago the shameless manipulation promoting a compromised personality at the forefront of the political life.

Two decades after the ousting of the Communist dictatorship, after earning freedom by the blood of thousands of Romanians, it took a sustained and tenacious manipulation to reach the current situation, in which: A character who in December 1989 was a second-rank Communist apparatchik and a long-term collaborator of the Securitate may be presented as a fighter against the Communism and the Communist Secret Services which he nevertheless embodies; may obtain political and moral support following a façade condemnation of Communism in a parliamentary show when in fact had the Parliament voted in favour of the lustration law, the President himself would have been the only candidate to suffer the consequences; A character tried before the High Court of Cassation and Justice in the most ample corruption trial in Romania – a trial suspended using lawyerly tricks and pressures in view of his position as President – may be presented as a fighter against corruption; A character produced and financed substantially by certain groups to which he owes various favours, a character who broke the law or tolerated the law being broken in his favour or in favour of his family and his clan may now talk about respecting the legal system in our country; A character with rudimentary education may issue statements, at a time when the world is on the threshold of the information society, about issues of education or research for which he has neither the necessary education, nor the required comprehension; A character who has demonstrated his incompetence in a lengthy ministerial position by destroying the fleet and blocking the building of motorways and in his position of Mayor of Bucharest by failing to initiate any urbanistic programmes may accuse others of incompetence and lack of professionalism; A character who is in a permanent state of conflict and an intrigue monger may be accepted as a valid moderator between the powers of the state;

A grobian fellow, a liar, sporting immoral attitudes and who ceaselessly proffers insults targeting persons and social categories may be presented as a role model for the people. One might perhaps accept the existence within the political landscape of various individuals who might fall into one or more of the incriminating categories enumerated so far. But when a person in whom all of the above disqualifying characteristics meet is elected in the highest position in the State and then is rewarded with the confidence of a certain segment of the intellectual elite and of the people as well as with outspoken electoral support, the situation seems surreal. It seems so to me, at least.

Apparently, though, the society in which we live does not concur. Since we have reached this point and we are discussing about real and surreal aspects, I would like to clearly state that all the facts and the characteristics just enumerated and attributed to the one who currently fulfils the role of Head of State are supported by original documents and by video and audio recordings publicly available. Even my fiercest detractors are fully aware of the fact that over the past twenty years I did not speak in public unless supported by certain, verified data. If, however, somebody doubts my word, I am ready to provide justifications for each and every statement either publicly or in the court of justice. I have deliberately avoided from the beginning pronouncing the name of the character I have described because the most serious and efficient manipulation of the public opinion has resulted in the opinion leaders splitting into two opposing factions, one supporting and the other accusing Basescu. This situation makes it difficult now to discuss facts and arguments in a rational fashion, transforming the Romanian electorate into football team followers of sorts, who hate their adversaries for no greater sin than that they belong to a different club. Whatever our personal or political sympathies may be, one may not avoid a question: how was it possible for a person whose past has been marked by illegal and immoral acts to accede to the highest position in the state and how could this person be supported thereafter in his actions, although these seriously affected the authority of State institutions and the international prestige of our country?

On elucidating this process depends to a good extent the way in which the next Presidential elections will be organised and what the result will be. Far from being an erotic fantasy of the Romanian electorate, the «Băsescu monument» is a collective creation to which many opinion leaders and a good proportion of the press have contributed. This is the reason why I will mention directly the acts of certain persons or groups: because the responsibility for this historical distortion must eventually be assumed.

Everything started in 2000, when, panicked by C.V. Tudor’s unexpected accession into the second round of the Presidential elections, part of the intellectuals known for their anti-communist or anti-FSN views have recommended electiong the «lesser evil» in the person of President Ion Iliescu, when the PSD did not need and had not asked for their help. This has been the first step in a long series of compromises.

The second step has been the taking over of the leadership of National-Liberal Party PNL by Teodor Stolojan, in whom the former Securitate had invested full confidence, thus fulfilling its post-communist dream, namely the taking over of the historical, democratic parties when these, such as Christdemocratic National Peasant Party PNŢCD, could not be eliminated.

Meanwhile, Traian Băsescu, by a direct understanding with Virgil Măgureanu, was absorbing the latter’s party, including all its «reliable comrades». It was the same Traian Băsescu who changed, in a manoeuvre best characterised as « bush-league politics », the ‘ideology’ of his party, transferring in a masquerade congress the Democratic Party PD from the Socialist International to the European Popular Party, a centre-right formation.

The terrain was now clear for the Romanian Academic Society (SAR), led by Alina Mungiu to form, alongside GDS and other civic associations the « Clean Romania » coalition, which would support the D.A. Alliance (of centre-rightist persuasion?) led by the two individuals completely compromised, both politically and morally, Traian Băsescu and Teodor Stolojan, again, in virtue of the slogan « elect the lesser evil ». The removal of the Năstase government, beneficial given the generalised corruption it tolerated and the Prime Minister’s tendency to control the press and the society, is followed by the coagulation of an intellectual group, led by G. Liiceanu, H.R. Patapievici, M.R.Ungureanu, C. Avramescu, M. Mihăieş, to which V. Tismăneanu and other less significant characters would adhere in time.

This group initiated a delirious campaign of eulogies addressed to Traian Băsescu, complemented by an equally vivacious campaign of ferocious attacks against anybody who dared oppose him. The climax of this campaign is reached on the occasion of the referendum for the suspension of the President, depicted in the colours of an anti-communist crusade of the salutary leader. The appearance on TV in a key position by the President’s side of Silvian Ionescu, the former director for Western Europe of the Romanian espionage is a signal for the undercover agents in the old Romanian diaspora, kept hidden for two decades, ad these would do everything in their power to feed the myth of the «anti-communist Băsescu». The support committees for Băsescu within the diaspora that are assiduously prepared in 2009 will doubtlessly make these people come back to surface.

This strange combination between the representatives of the former anticommunist elite, former collaborators of the Securitate exposed as momentary interests required (see for example the Balaceanu Stolnici case, when he refused to follow Teodor Stolojan in PLD), undercover agents in the press, whose existence has been openly admitted by the romanian secret services and the internet one-day-heroes who are part of the so-called digital guerrilla paid by the piece has represented the resistance piece of President Traian Băsescu in all his manoeuvres aimed at building a political system based on pressures, blackmail and diversions. It is to be expected that in the current campaign the methods of 2004 and 2007 would be used again, in amplified form. As the negative audit at the end of Traian Băsescu will be hard to explain, the main thrust of the campaign will be on blackening the image of the opponents, discouragement of the electorate by agitating the idea that certain opponents stand no chance and eventually by revitalising the old tune of «electing the lesser evil».

To those who might allow themselves to be deceived by this predictable tactic, I say that in 2009 we have the possibility to exclude the political and moral blackmail of 2000, 2004 and 2007. In 2009, we have the opportunity to choose the good, to delimitate it both from the «greater evil» and the «lesser evil».

In my opinion, in the political landscape there is now a valid candidate: Crin Antonescu, the leader of National-Liberal Party.

Crin Antonescu may be defined not just by comparing him against Traian Băsescu who is now the «greater evil», but also by comparing him against the model of the European President that Romania needs. Crin Antonescu is not soiled by any of the sins so wide-spread in the political landscape after December 1989: he was not a communist apparatchik or activist and has not compromised his image by speaking or writing in favour of that regime; He did not collaborate with the Securitate and cannot be used or blackmailed as such; Has never been accuses, even in jest, of corruption, although he held for four years the position of Minister; Does not have any unclean business with interest groups and has not become rich by exercising economic activities to the detriment of the time dedicated to the public office; Has demonstrated he possesses the qualities of a politician and a man of state in difficult moments in which some have compromised, some have sold their honour or have abandoned the difficult struggle to preserve their moral convictions, the lawfulness of their actions and their personal honesty; He is an educated, fair person, capable of discussing in civilised manner and listen to the opinions of others. The time has come to discuss about one of the regrettable aspects which have become apparent over the past few years: the promotion of young politicians who are arrogant and incompetent, which has resulted in the general compromising of an entire generation and which is a dangerous fallacy. This also draws our attention to the fact that now, with the Presidential elections drawing near, we can no longer afford hopes, but must rely on certainties. Crin Antonescu appears to be a certainty: he has a mature personality, has demonstrated his qualities as Member of the Parliament, as Minister, as president of a party. Supporting Crin Antonescu is no blindfolded jump into the unknown, it is the recognition of a permanently ascending career. Considering the acts of every presidential candidate, options should swing in their majority in favour of the candidate whose profile is closest to Crin Antonescu’s.

Unfortunately, things are not thus. The forces of Evil have learned the craft of disguise. Occult influences meet declared fanaticism, empathy directed at evil is stronger than the one oriented towards the good. Many of those who could no longer support evil openly will attempt to destroy the reputations of the fair and honest. At any time one may invent the lack of real or imaginary qualities in order to justify the incapacity of the « disappointed by trade » to support anybody but themselves. The force of the local party structures, corruption of the electorate, the dirty money of the interest groups may change the natural order constructed by the personal value of each candidate. This is why the success of Crin Antonescu’s candidacy is not only his or PNL’s problem, it is a test of the “awareness of the civil society”, which has the opportunity to redefine itself. Traian Băsescu has identified within the civil society those inclined by mentality to sycophancy and making a profit by any means. We will have to identify those wo still believe in the moral values and who are willing to fight for them. I launch an appeal to create a support group for Crin Antonescu’s candidacy, made up of important representatives in the field of science, culture, art, technology, economy and finances.

This support group may then engage in a dialogue, in its own name and through direct contact, the local opinion leaders: physicians, teachers, engineers, small entrepreneurs, workers and farmers respected in their communities. The last parliamentary elections, the local and the Euro-parliamentary elections have made patent the moral filth of this society. We can now bring back to the surface the profound Romania which works, thinks and lives by the rules of the common sense. To those who believe the civil society is convicted to the position of simple spectator before the dirty games of Romanian politics, I answer things are by no means so.

If between 1990 and 1996 the strength of the civil society has managed to stop Romania from turning into an oligarchy and has succeeded in imposing even to the supporters of a “perestroika” variant an authentically European project, it will succeed now also. Not by nostalgically repeating old slogans, but by an approach synchronised with the new European status of Romania.

It is necessary to raise the level of responsibility of the entire civic sector, of the foundations and the professional or humanitarian associations, of the associations of economists and finance specialists, of the honest journalists in order to overcome the political and moral crisis in Romania. Among the actions that the civil society ought to enact immediately are the following: Liberating itself from the influence of false opinion leaders and of false intellectual role models who propose false debate themes; Building a direct communication network on the internet between different think tanks, which hold a vast amount of information and expertise not used at the moment for the public good; Breaking the blockage imposed by the media (more preoccupied for commercial reasons with promoting aggressive impostors or pseudo-values in science and culture) which affects this capital of intelligence and knowledge; Creating a direct connection between the promoters of technological or humanistic intelligence in the diaspora, people whose value has been demonstrated home and abroad; Sensitising the blogger community, which holds great potential of intelligence to clean up the virtual space of the vulgarity, obscenity and the intolerance which attack behind the shield of anonymity; Replacing the current «dialogue of the deaf» between politicians and their agitator groups with a real dialogue between intellectuals who are part of the support committees of various candidates, formed on ideological grounds, which would concentrate mainly on the themes which pertain to the constitutional role of the President; Putting pressure on the National Council of the Audio-Visual to severely penalise the broadcasting of nicknames and insulting expressions which compromise the debate; Constant academic monitoring of pollsters to compel these to act in a more professional and transparent manner, doubled by a campaign to eliminate from the market those pollsters whose reputation has been compromised in 2000 and 2004 by presenting to the public gross and deliberate deceptions; A check of the signature lists in favour of various candidates by NGOs of unblemished reputation.

Coming back to the candidate in whose favour I speak, I would like to remind you that upon launching his presidential platform in July 2009, Crin Antonescu has declared the time had come to discard the political clienteles of all parties, stating he includes here the political clientele of the liberals, and that in their stead the intellectual elites ought to be gathered in order to contribute to the progress of our country. He has declared he does not wish to be a player president, nor a president who would only represent the PNL, but rather all the honest people in all parties and particularly from the civil society.

We now have the opportunity to answer positively to this offer. Now we can separate good from bad and the time has come for us to do so. This is no longer just about our academic careers, our businesses or our personal projects, it is about the world in which we live or in which we would like to live. And the world will not change by itself. We all need a President who would have the capacity to consolidate the creative energies of the nation around a major project.

Such a President will be elected and, more importantly, will be convincing and affective in his future mission if he will not represent one party alone, but all the healthy forces of the nation. By giving a chance to Crin Antonescu, we give a chance to Romania to have a President worthy of its European status, earned with such great efforts.

Emil Constantinescu

President of the Romanian Foundation for Democracy

August 31, 2009

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http://pnl.ro/ (Party)

http://www.crinantonescu.ro/ (Blog)

http://www.facebook.com/CrinAntonescuPresedinte (Facebook)

http://www.flickr.com/photos/crinantonescu (Flickr)

http://www.linkedin.com/in/crinantonescu (LinkedIn)

http://twitter.com/crinantonescu09 (Twitter)

http://www.crinantonescu.ro/Manifest.html (Election platform)

http://www.crinantonescu.ro/contribuie.html (Fundraising)

http://www.SprijinPentruCrin.ro (PoliticalActionComittee)

http://www.tnl.ro/ (Youth Organisation)

http://www.csl.ro/ (Liberal Students)

http://www.onfl.ro/ (Liberal Woman’s Council)

http://www.PNTCD-Cluj.ro/ (PoliticalAllianceComittee)

Agenda – EP

The current economic crisis will have direct consequences on employment. Parliament believes the efforts being made under the recovery plan by the EU and its Member States must be coordinated.

The future of social security systems
Several times during the 2004-2009 legislature, MEPs voted on the viability of social security systems in the European Union, a real challenge for the coming decades. The section of the European Union’s population aged 15 to 64 will fall by 48 million by 2050 and the dependency ratio will double in the same period, leading to increased public expenditure in most Member States on pensions and health.
The social dimension of the internal market
During the debate on the services directive the question arose of including services of general interest (SGI), such as education and social security. The new European Commission may propose a specific framework directive on SGI. In the current Parliament there are deep divisions over the need for such legislation.
Reconciling work and private life

In October 2008, the European Commission proposed a package of measures aimed at better reconciling work and family life, including a revision of EU law on maternity leave and leave for an assisting spouse. Parliament, which has joint decision-making powers on this matter, must vote on it at first reading before the European elections. However, if a compromise with the Council is not reached by then, the new Parliament will have to take up the baton.
Cross-border healthcare
A draft law which would facilitate patients’ access to healthcare in the European Union is currently being examined by the European Parliament. The aim is to clarify entitlements to refunds and to guarantee quality and safety standards for patients who have medical care in a Member State other than their own.  Here too, Parliament has joint decision-making power and must vote at first reading before April 2009, before the elections. However, if a compromise is not reached by then, the new Parliament will resume discussions.

Workers’ mobility

A draft directive aimed a easing workers’ mobility by laying down minimum standards for the acquisition of supplementary pension rights was approved by Parliament at first reading in June 2007.  The directive is now awaiting a decision from the Council.

Working time directive

Lastly, the new Parliament will also have to pick up the question of working hours in the EU, following negotiations between the Council and Parliament prior to the elections. At a vote in December 2008, Parliament took the position that the EU’s maximum working week should stay at 48 hours and that derogations to this principle should be scrapped.

Foreign affairs

Foreign affairs challenges include replacing the expired Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Russia, preventing the disruption of gas supplies from Russia via the Ukraine, removing non-tariff barriers to trade with China, seeking a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and monitoring progress towards association agreements with Latin America.
EU-Russia
EU-Russia relations have been fraught with difficulties in recent years, especially over energy supplies and the conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These issues will doubtless play a role in talks on replacing the EU-Russia partnership agreement, which expired in 2007.MEPs have already said that a continuation of the status quo in Georgia will make it hard for them to endorse such a new agreement.
Gas from Russia
In September 2008, the European Parliament backed the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline, from Turkey via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria, as an alternative to those constructed with Russia, which “will all potentially increase the economic and political dependence of Member States on Russia”. MEPs will want to ensure that sufficient budget funds are available for the Nabucco project.
EU-China
China’s protectionist practices, excessive bureaucracy, the undervaluing of the Renminbi, subsidies in various forms, and lack of a proper and agreed level of intellectual property rights  enforcement, are hindering full market access for many EU companies, according to the European Parliament. China’s non-tariff barriers cost EU companies an estimated €21bn in lost business opportunities each year. MEPs will keep the spotlight on these barriers until they are lifted.  Parliament is also insisting on the need to strengthen the Human Rights Clause in the negotiations for a renewed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
EU-Middle East
MEPs will continue to work for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reminding the parties of the commitment they gave in Annapolis in November 2007 to hold negotiations with a view to concluding a peace treaty, including respect for Israel’s right to live in security and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. The EP Foreign Affairs Committee has adjourned its assent for increased participation by Israel in Community programmes as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

EU-South America

MEPs will closely follow the future association agreements with the South American sub-regions (Mercosur, the Andean Community and Central America) as well as the economic partnership agreement with the Caribbean, on which the European Parliament will have to give its formal assent. Parliament will monitor developments via its delegation to the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, set up in 2006.

EU enlargement

Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 2007, will not be the last to do so. Croatia, Turkey, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are official candidates. Others, such as Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, also have a “prospect” of joining. Debates about whether they are ready to join, and possible dates for joining, will be high on Parliament’s agenda in the coming years.
The next big date in the EU enlargement diary will be October 2009, when the European Commission publishes its annual “progress” report on Croatia, Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo.

Croatia, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Croatia seems to have made good progress towards membership, although MEPs say it still needs to take measures to fight organized crime, and its border dispute with Slovenia causes concern. Turkey’s limited progress in 2008 prompted some MEPs to question Ankara’s will to pursue reform, although others remain more positive. At the time of writing, it was not yet clear when EU membership negotiations would start with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Western Balkans

Western Balkan countries which have stabilization and association agreements with the EU and a long-term prospect of EU membership must make progress on judicial and police reform, enforcing the rule of law and improving administrative capacity.
Serbia may achieve candidate status in 2009, provided it carries out the necessary reforms.The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedoniagood progress on judicial and police reform is overshadowed by shortcomings in meeting political criteria. For Montenegro, strengthening the rule of law and administrative capacity remains a challenge. Bosnia’s leaders have yet to achieve the degree of political consensus that has delivered progress towards EU integration elsewhere in the region. It also needs to move EU-related reforms to the top of the agenda, says the European Commission. And for Albania, a key test will be its handling of the 2009 elections.

Police, judges and customs offficers from the EU were deployed in Kosovo in December 2008, with Serbia’s agreement, in a drive to improve law enforcement. The EU Rule of Law (EULEX) mission is the largest civilian one yet under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). By spring 2009, it was expected to grow to 1,900 international members and 1,100 national ones, with a €205 million budget for the first 16 months. Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs praised Serbia’s constructive attitude, which, they said, was consistent with its aspirations to join the EU.
Any accession to the European Union needs the approval of the European Parliament.

Immigration

The arrival each year of many immigrants in the EU, often in tragic circumstances, is forcing Member States to cooperate on the management of migration. In this field, any policy applied by one country has an impact on its neighbour, especially in southern Europe. The creation of a balanced immigration policy should benefit both the north and the south of the continent.
Preliminary steps such as the “Blue Card” and the “return directive” have already been taken. A goal of the next legislature will be the development of a coordinated migration policy which is humane, open to legal immigration but firm on illegal immigration. If the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, the European Parliament will have full legislative powers in this domain.
A balanced approach to managing immigration
The current Parliament having already dealt with the highly controversial “return directive”, the challenge for the next Parliament will be to end the tragedies caused by illegal immigration and to promote channels for legal immigration, especially in sectors with labour shortages.
This in its turn raises other questions, notably how to combat undeclared work effectively.  In addition, promoting legal immigration based on the economic needs of Member States raises the issue of equal rights between workers and non-discrimination.  Lastly, what status should be given to seasonal labourers, who work mainly in farming, often for very short periods? Draft European legislation is being proposed on these matters.
The European Parliament is also wondering about the brain drain that could be caused by a policy of seeking to attract skilled workers from non-EU countries. How can “circular” migration be encouraged, by which workers would develop their skills in the Union and then return home, enabling their country of origin to benefit?
Creating a more effective asylum system based on solidarity
The next Parliament will also tackle the issue of how the European Union receives asylum seekers, and the future of the Dublin system, which is supposed to identify the Member States responsible for processing an asylum application and establish reasonable deadlines for procedures. In practice, asylum seekers often have to wait months if not years in certain Member States – in greatly differing conditions, as some countries use detention while others do not – until their application is finally processed.
In addition, MEPs have pointed several times to the lack of trust between Member States and the unequal burden-sharing of processing asylum-seekers applications – the southern Member States having to deal with the biggest administrative burden. The system will need to be adapted to process asylum applications more quickly and devise a tool which creates trust between Member States.  The “asylum package”, unveiled in December, contains several proposals on which MEPs will be working to find answers to these questions.

External border surveillance and the future of the FRONTEX agency

Lastly, the FRONTEX agency, launched in October 2005 to facilitate operational cooperation on the EU’s external borders as part of the fight against illegal immigration, needs to have a medium-term strategy, according to a parliamentary report adopted last December. MEPs believe the Agency suffers from its dependence on the goodwill of the Member States for material (planes, boats, etc.). Should it have its own resources or stay as a platform for cooperation? MEPs are considering a system of compulsory solidarity, requiring Member States to give material support to FRONTEX.

Terrorism and security

In the years following attacks on New York, Madrid and London, the Member States improved their coordination in the fight against terrorism, partly through the “cooperation platforms” provided by Europol and Eurojust. New measures to prevent acts of terrorism will be examined by MEPs in the new Parliament.  The balance between security and protection on the one hand and privacy and fundamental rights on the other will also be key issues.
Terrorism: the risk of the “dirty bomb”

During the next Parliament, the European Union will adopt a range of measures relating to the risk of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical attacks, on preventing or helping cope with any such incident.  Member States which already have a system for responding to this type of attack need to be able to share their methods with other Member States and, if necessary, provide them with help. Stricter surveillance of the substances needed to concoct a dirty bomb will also be needed.  Legislation on assistance to victims will also be examined, to bring treatment, whether physical or psychological, up to the best available standards in the EU.
Safeguarding freedoms and protecting data
The question of how far anti-terrorist measures can go without impinging on civil liberties such as the right to privacy and freedom of expression will become more pressing. In coming years the protection of personal data and of digital data in particular will be crucial.  Such data, containing a  mass of information on who we are and what we do, is processed by many public or private operators, often unknown by the public, for commercial or security purposes.

A majority of Members of the European Parliament has repeatedly voiced concern in the past at the casual approach of Member States to the protection of personal data. An example is the case of Passenger Name Records (PNR), covering a range of data on individual passengers, such as nationality, address, itinerary and credit card number). These are collected in several Member States in order to combat terrorism and organised crime, and a system at European level is expected to be introduced in the near future. The question is whether the fight against terrorism justifies such an intrusion into the private lives of ordinary people. This legislation will be on the next Parliament’s work list, as will legislation on the protection of data used in criminal proceedings.

Agriculture: new reform to take place in the context of the budget debate and the new global situation

MEPs elected in June 2009 will take part in preparations for the next major overhaul of the CAP, scheduled for 2013. The outcome will depend partly on the expected budgetary battle between Member States on the post-2013 period and partly on other factors such as climate change.  The Lisbon Treaty, if ratified, will give Parliament joint-decision making powers with agriculture ministers in this area.
Most current decisions on the common agriculture policy (CAP) will expire in 2013. In particular, farm aid and various market regulation instruments such as dairy quotas which are due to expire will have to be reviewed. The European Union therefore has to carry out a new, wide-ranging reform during the 2009-2014 legislative period.
Negotiations on the EU’s next long-term budget plan, covering the post-2013 period, are bound to relaunch the debate on the CAP’s share of the budget and thus influence the reform. The sums to be allocated to agriculture policy will greatly depend on the scale and duration of the current economic crisis and the financial health of Member States when the talks are held.
In addition, the rise of food prices in 2007/2008 and the prospect of greater volatility in agricultural prices have refocused attention on the role of the CAP in world food security. Competition from non-food products such as biofuels for energy will be part of the debate.
Lastly, the future of rural development policy in preserving territorial cohesion and the public’s expectations, notably as regards quality, respect for the environment and animal welfare, will probably be key features of the reform.
New climate realities
European farming must prepare for climate change and adapt.  There will be consequences for arable farming (more drought and smaller harvests in the south, an increased risk of natural disasters, etc.) and for livestock production (new diseases or mutations of existing viruses, with serious health and economic consequences). In addition, negotiations on the post-Kyoto situation will provide an opportunity to reflect on current production models and devise less polluting systems. This new reality will have to be reflected gradually in policy decisions on agriculture.
Possible new responsibilities for MEPs
If the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, codecision will apply to most decisions taken on agricultural policy, with new responsibilities for MEPs and an obligation for the Council of Ministers to negotiate with the EP, which is currently not the case.  This will help reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the CAP in the eyes of the public.

The Lisbon Treaty: more powers for the European Parliament

If and when ratified by EU Member States, the Lisbon Treaty would create the legal framework and tools needed to meet Europe’s most pressing challenges. By giving the directly elected Parliament more power, it would make the EU more accountable.
More democratic accountability
With a few exceptions, it would place the European Parliament (EP) on an equal footing as lawmaker with the Council, representing EU Member States, in areas where this has not been case so far, notably in setting the EU budget (Parliament would enjoy full parity), agriculture policy and justice and home affairs. National parliaments would gain the right to object to a proposal if they felt that a given result could be better attained at national rather than EU level.
A Commission President would be selected by EU heads of government on the basis of the European election results and approved by the EP. The appointment of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs would also be subject to Parliament’s consent.
More rights and clarity for citizens
Citizens’ rights would also be strengthened. For example, the Treaty would make the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights binding upon the EU itself, thus requiring EU institutions to respect citizens’ civil, political, economic or social rights.  A new right of Citizens’ Initiative would enable groups who can muster one million signatures to call upon the Commission to put forward new policy proposals, thus increasing citizens’ participation in EU decision-making.
Greater effectiveness
The Treaty also aims to improve the efficiency of the EU’s decision-making process by increasing the use of qualified majority voting, replacing unanimity, and thus facilitating agreements in the Council of Ministers.  The new European Council President and the High Representative for foreign policy should improve the consistency of EU action.
More legislative power for the European Parliament
The Lisbon Treaty would make Parliament a co-legislator with the Council in a series of new fields.  Some of these, currently dealt with only by the Council, would be handled under the co-decision procedure. Others are completely new policy areas for the EU.
Existing EU policies which become subject to co-decision (non-exhaustive list)
Visas, asylum (some aspects, including conditions for the reception of applicants), legal immigration (including conditions of entry and residence), judicial cooperation in criminal matters, police cooperation, common financial provisions, measures necessary for the use of the Euro, structural funds, agriculture and fisheries policies.
New policy areas to be introduced by the Lisbon Treaty which will be subject to co-decision (non-exhaustive list)
Energy (energy internal market is already under co-decision), border checks, sport, services of general economic interest, personal data protection, immigration (combating human trafficking and promoting integration), European intellectual property rights, public health (measures setting high quality standards, but not harmonisation), space policy and tourism.