Agenda – EP

The current economic crisis will have direct consequences on employment. Parliament believes the efforts being made under the recovery plan by the EU and its Member States must be coordinated.

The future of social security systems
Several times during the 2004-2009 legislature, MEPs voted on the viability of social security systems in the European Union, a real challenge for the coming decades. The section of the European Union’s population aged 15 to 64 will fall by 48 million by 2050 and the dependency ratio will double in the same period, leading to increased public expenditure in most Member States on pensions and health.
The social dimension of the internal market
During the debate on the services directive the question arose of including services of general interest (SGI), such as education and social security. The new European Commission may propose a specific framework directive on SGI. In the current Parliament there are deep divisions over the need for such legislation.
Reconciling work and private life

In October 2008, the European Commission proposed a package of measures aimed at better reconciling work and family life, including a revision of EU law on maternity leave and leave for an assisting spouse. Parliament, which has joint decision-making powers on this matter, must vote on it at first reading before the European elections. However, if a compromise with the Council is not reached by then, the new Parliament will have to take up the baton.
Cross-border healthcare
A draft law which would facilitate patients’ access to healthcare in the European Union is currently being examined by the European Parliament. The aim is to clarify entitlements to refunds and to guarantee quality and safety standards for patients who have medical care in a Member State other than their own.  Here too, Parliament has joint decision-making power and must vote at first reading before April 2009, before the elections. However, if a compromise is not reached by then, the new Parliament will resume discussions.

Workers’ mobility

A draft directive aimed a easing workers’ mobility by laying down minimum standards for the acquisition of supplementary pension rights was approved by Parliament at first reading in June 2007.  The directive is now awaiting a decision from the Council.

Working time directive

Lastly, the new Parliament will also have to pick up the question of working hours in the EU, following negotiations between the Council and Parliament prior to the elections. At a vote in December 2008, Parliament took the position that the EU’s maximum working week should stay at 48 hours and that derogations to this principle should be scrapped.

Foreign affairs

Foreign affairs challenges include replacing the expired Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Russia, preventing the disruption of gas supplies from Russia via the Ukraine, removing non-tariff barriers to trade with China, seeking a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and monitoring progress towards association agreements with Latin America.
EU-Russia
EU-Russia relations have been fraught with difficulties in recent years, especially over energy supplies and the conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These issues will doubtless play a role in talks on replacing the EU-Russia partnership agreement, which expired in 2007.MEPs have already said that a continuation of the status quo in Georgia will make it hard for them to endorse such a new agreement.
Gas from Russia
In September 2008, the European Parliament backed the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline, from Turkey via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria, as an alternative to those constructed with Russia, which “will all potentially increase the economic and political dependence of Member States on Russia”. MEPs will want to ensure that sufficient budget funds are available for the Nabucco project.
EU-China
China’s protectionist practices, excessive bureaucracy, the undervaluing of the Renminbi, subsidies in various forms, and lack of a proper and agreed level of intellectual property rights  enforcement, are hindering full market access for many EU companies, according to the European Parliament. China’s non-tariff barriers cost EU companies an estimated €21bn in lost business opportunities each year. MEPs will keep the spotlight on these barriers until they are lifted.  Parliament is also insisting on the need to strengthen the Human Rights Clause in the negotiations for a renewed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
EU-Middle East
MEPs will continue to work for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reminding the parties of the commitment they gave in Annapolis in November 2007 to hold negotiations with a view to concluding a peace treaty, including respect for Israel’s right to live in security and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. The EP Foreign Affairs Committee has adjourned its assent for increased participation by Israel in Community programmes as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

EU-South America

MEPs will closely follow the future association agreements with the South American sub-regions (Mercosur, the Andean Community and Central America) as well as the economic partnership agreement with the Caribbean, on which the European Parliament will have to give its formal assent. Parliament will monitor developments via its delegation to the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, set up in 2006.

EU enlargement

Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 2007, will not be the last to do so. Croatia, Turkey, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are official candidates. Others, such as Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, also have a “prospect” of joining. Debates about whether they are ready to join, and possible dates for joining, will be high on Parliament’s agenda in the coming years.
The next big date in the EU enlargement diary will be October 2009, when the European Commission publishes its annual “progress” report on Croatia, Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo.

Croatia, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Croatia seems to have made good progress towards membership, although MEPs say it still needs to take measures to fight organized crime, and its border dispute with Slovenia causes concern. Turkey’s limited progress in 2008 prompted some MEPs to question Ankara’s will to pursue reform, although others remain more positive. At the time of writing, it was not yet clear when EU membership negotiations would start with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Western Balkans

Western Balkan countries which have stabilization and association agreements with the EU and a long-term prospect of EU membership must make progress on judicial and police reform, enforcing the rule of law and improving administrative capacity.
Serbia may achieve candidate status in 2009, provided it carries out the necessary reforms.The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedoniagood progress on judicial and police reform is overshadowed by shortcomings in meeting political criteria. For Montenegro, strengthening the rule of law and administrative capacity remains a challenge. Bosnia’s leaders have yet to achieve the degree of political consensus that has delivered progress towards EU integration elsewhere in the region. It also needs to move EU-related reforms to the top of the agenda, says the European Commission. And for Albania, a key test will be its handling of the 2009 elections.

Police, judges and customs offficers from the EU were deployed in Kosovo in December 2008, with Serbia’s agreement, in a drive to improve law enforcement. The EU Rule of Law (EULEX) mission is the largest civilian one yet under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). By spring 2009, it was expected to grow to 1,900 international members and 1,100 national ones, with a €205 million budget for the first 16 months. Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs praised Serbia’s constructive attitude, which, they said, was consistent with its aspirations to join the EU.
Any accession to the European Union needs the approval of the European Parliament.

Immigration

The arrival each year of many immigrants in the EU, often in tragic circumstances, is forcing Member States to cooperate on the management of migration. In this field, any policy applied by one country has an impact on its neighbour, especially in southern Europe. The creation of a balanced immigration policy should benefit both the north and the south of the continent.
Preliminary steps such as the “Blue Card” and the “return directive” have already been taken. A goal of the next legislature will be the development of a coordinated migration policy which is humane, open to legal immigration but firm on illegal immigration. If the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, the European Parliament will have full legislative powers in this domain.
A balanced approach to managing immigration
The current Parliament having already dealt with the highly controversial “return directive”, the challenge for the next Parliament will be to end the tragedies caused by illegal immigration and to promote channels for legal immigration, especially in sectors with labour shortages.
This in its turn raises other questions, notably how to combat undeclared work effectively.  In addition, promoting legal immigration based on the economic needs of Member States raises the issue of equal rights between workers and non-discrimination.  Lastly, what status should be given to seasonal labourers, who work mainly in farming, often for very short periods? Draft European legislation is being proposed on these matters.
The European Parliament is also wondering about the brain drain that could be caused by a policy of seeking to attract skilled workers from non-EU countries. How can “circular” migration be encouraged, by which workers would develop their skills in the Union and then return home, enabling their country of origin to benefit?
Creating a more effective asylum system based on solidarity
The next Parliament will also tackle the issue of how the European Union receives asylum seekers, and the future of the Dublin system, which is supposed to identify the Member States responsible for processing an asylum application and establish reasonable deadlines for procedures. In practice, asylum seekers often have to wait months if not years in certain Member States – in greatly differing conditions, as some countries use detention while others do not – until their application is finally processed.
In addition, MEPs have pointed several times to the lack of trust between Member States and the unequal burden-sharing of processing asylum-seekers applications – the southern Member States having to deal with the biggest administrative burden. The system will need to be adapted to process asylum applications more quickly and devise a tool which creates trust between Member States.  The “asylum package”, unveiled in December, contains several proposals on which MEPs will be working to find answers to these questions.

External border surveillance and the future of the FRONTEX agency

Lastly, the FRONTEX agency, launched in October 2005 to facilitate operational cooperation on the EU’s external borders as part of the fight against illegal immigration, needs to have a medium-term strategy, according to a parliamentary report adopted last December. MEPs believe the Agency suffers from its dependence on the goodwill of the Member States for material (planes, boats, etc.). Should it have its own resources or stay as a platform for cooperation? MEPs are considering a system of compulsory solidarity, requiring Member States to give material support to FRONTEX.

Terrorism and security

In the years following attacks on New York, Madrid and London, the Member States improved their coordination in the fight against terrorism, partly through the “cooperation platforms” provided by Europol and Eurojust. New measures to prevent acts of terrorism will be examined by MEPs in the new Parliament.  The balance between security and protection on the one hand and privacy and fundamental rights on the other will also be key issues.
Terrorism: the risk of the “dirty bomb”

During the next Parliament, the European Union will adopt a range of measures relating to the risk of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical attacks, on preventing or helping cope with any such incident.  Member States which already have a system for responding to this type of attack need to be able to share their methods with other Member States and, if necessary, provide them with help. Stricter surveillance of the substances needed to concoct a dirty bomb will also be needed.  Legislation on assistance to victims will also be examined, to bring treatment, whether physical or psychological, up to the best available standards in the EU.
Safeguarding freedoms and protecting data
The question of how far anti-terrorist measures can go without impinging on civil liberties such as the right to privacy and freedom of expression will become more pressing. In coming years the protection of personal data and of digital data in particular will be crucial.  Such data, containing a  mass of information on who we are and what we do, is processed by many public or private operators, often unknown by the public, for commercial or security purposes.

A majority of Members of the European Parliament has repeatedly voiced concern in the past at the casual approach of Member States to the protection of personal data. An example is the case of Passenger Name Records (PNR), covering a range of data on individual passengers, such as nationality, address, itinerary and credit card number). These are collected in several Member States in order to combat terrorism and organised crime, and a system at European level is expected to be introduced in the near future. The question is whether the fight against terrorism justifies such an intrusion into the private lives of ordinary people. This legislation will be on the next Parliament’s work list, as will legislation on the protection of data used in criminal proceedings.

Agriculture: new reform to take place in the context of the budget debate and the new global situation

MEPs elected in June 2009 will take part in preparations for the next major overhaul of the CAP, scheduled for 2013. The outcome will depend partly on the expected budgetary battle between Member States on the post-2013 period and partly on other factors such as climate change.  The Lisbon Treaty, if ratified, will give Parliament joint-decision making powers with agriculture ministers in this area.
Most current decisions on the common agriculture policy (CAP) will expire in 2013. In particular, farm aid and various market regulation instruments such as dairy quotas which are due to expire will have to be reviewed. The European Union therefore has to carry out a new, wide-ranging reform during the 2009-2014 legislative period.
Negotiations on the EU’s next long-term budget plan, covering the post-2013 period, are bound to relaunch the debate on the CAP’s share of the budget and thus influence the reform. The sums to be allocated to agriculture policy will greatly depend on the scale and duration of the current economic crisis and the financial health of Member States when the talks are held.
In addition, the rise of food prices in 2007/2008 and the prospect of greater volatility in agricultural prices have refocused attention on the role of the CAP in world food security. Competition from non-food products such as biofuels for energy will be part of the debate.
Lastly, the future of rural development policy in preserving territorial cohesion and the public’s expectations, notably as regards quality, respect for the environment and animal welfare, will probably be key features of the reform.
New climate realities
European farming must prepare for climate change and adapt.  There will be consequences for arable farming (more drought and smaller harvests in the south, an increased risk of natural disasters, etc.) and for livestock production (new diseases or mutations of existing viruses, with serious health and economic consequences). In addition, negotiations on the post-Kyoto situation will provide an opportunity to reflect on current production models and devise less polluting systems. This new reality will have to be reflected gradually in policy decisions on agriculture.
Possible new responsibilities for MEPs
If the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, codecision will apply to most decisions taken on agricultural policy, with new responsibilities for MEPs and an obligation for the Council of Ministers to negotiate with the EP, which is currently not the case.  This will help reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the CAP in the eyes of the public.

The Lisbon Treaty: more powers for the European Parliament

If and when ratified by EU Member States, the Lisbon Treaty would create the legal framework and tools needed to meet Europe’s most pressing challenges. By giving the directly elected Parliament more power, it would make the EU more accountable.
More democratic accountability
With a few exceptions, it would place the European Parliament (EP) on an equal footing as lawmaker with the Council, representing EU Member States, in areas where this has not been case so far, notably in setting the EU budget (Parliament would enjoy full parity), agriculture policy and justice and home affairs. National parliaments would gain the right to object to a proposal if they felt that a given result could be better attained at national rather than EU level.
A Commission President would be selected by EU heads of government on the basis of the European election results and approved by the EP. The appointment of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs would also be subject to Parliament’s consent.
More rights and clarity for citizens
Citizens’ rights would also be strengthened. For example, the Treaty would make the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights binding upon the EU itself, thus requiring EU institutions to respect citizens’ civil, political, economic or social rights.  A new right of Citizens’ Initiative would enable groups who can muster one million signatures to call upon the Commission to put forward new policy proposals, thus increasing citizens’ participation in EU decision-making.
Greater effectiveness
The Treaty also aims to improve the efficiency of the EU’s decision-making process by increasing the use of qualified majority voting, replacing unanimity, and thus facilitating agreements in the Council of Ministers.  The new European Council President and the High Representative for foreign policy should improve the consistency of EU action.
More legislative power for the European Parliament
The Lisbon Treaty would make Parliament a co-legislator with the Council in a series of new fields.  Some of these, currently dealt with only by the Council, would be handled under the co-decision procedure. Others are completely new policy areas for the EU.
Existing EU policies which become subject to co-decision (non-exhaustive list)
Visas, asylum (some aspects, including conditions for the reception of applicants), legal immigration (including conditions of entry and residence), judicial cooperation in criminal matters, police cooperation, common financial provisions, measures necessary for the use of the Euro, structural funds, agriculture and fisheries policies.
New policy areas to be introduced by the Lisbon Treaty which will be subject to co-decision (non-exhaustive list)
Energy (energy internal market is already under co-decision), border checks, sport, services of general economic interest, personal data protection, immigration (combating human trafficking and promoting integration), European intellectual property rights, public health (measures setting high quality standards, but not harmonisation), space policy and tourism.

Crin Antonescu

Liberalism in Romania

This article gives an overview of Liberalism and Radicalism in Romania. It is limited to liberal parties with substantial support, mainly proved by having had a representation in parliament. The sign ⇒ denotes another party in this scheme. For inclusion in this scheme it is not necessary for a party to have actually labeled itself as a liberal party.

Liberalism has always during democratic periods been of the major forces in Romania, mainly organized in the National Liberal Party. Often there were spin-offs of this party. At the moment the National Liberal Party (Partidul Naţional Liberal, member LIELDR) is aright-wing liberal party.

History

1822: Ionică Tăutu, representing a group of low-ranking boyars in Moldavia, proposed a constitutional project with republican and liberal principles

1834: Ion Câmpineanu leads the liberal opposition to Russian influence in Wallachia‘s National Assembly

1840: Mitică Filipescu led a radical, carbonari-inspired conspiracy in Wallachia

1840: Mihail Kogălniceanu published the short-lived Dacia Literară, a Romantic nationalist and liberal magazine, engendering a literary society

1843: Nicolae Bălcescu and others led the Frăţia radical conspiracy in Wallachia

1845: Radical students from both Wallachia and Moldavia founded Societatea Studenţilor Români (the “Society of Romanian Students”) in Paris

1848: The unsuccessful Moldavian revolution, during which Moldavian liberals issued a Petition-Proclamation

1848: The liberal-minded Blaj Assemblies in Transylvania, in the context of revolutions inside the Austrian Empire

1848: The Wallachian revolution – liberals formed a Provisional Government in Bucharest, and were divided over the issue of land reform, with a radical current forming around Bălcescu

1856: The liberal current formed the majority in Partida Naţională, a loose group supporting the union of the Danubian Principalities

1859: After the union, liberals formed a distinct faction in the Parliament of Romania

1864: Domnitor Alexander John Cuza established a personal regime, in order to pass liberal legislation against mounting opposition

1866: Mainstream liberals supported Cuza’s removal from the throne; a faction of the liberal current opposed to the new constitution formed the Moldavian-based Fracţiunea liberă şi independentă, influenced by Simion Bărnuţiu and led by Nicolae Ionescu

National Liberal Party

1875: The liberal current organised itself in the National Liberal Party (Partidul Naţional-Liberal), led by Ion Brătianu

1884: A faction formed the Radical Party, led by C.A. Rosetti and George Panu

1899: The National Liberal Party absorbs the right-wing of the Romanian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party

1918: The Peasants’ Party absorbs a left-wing tendency in the National Liberal Party formed around Constantin Stere

1929: A faction formed the ⇒ National Liberal Party-Brătianu

1931: A faction formed the Liberal Democratic Party, which remained unsuccessful. The same year a majority of the Brătianu party returned in the National Liberal Party

1938: The rest of the Brătianu party returned in the National Liberal Party

1938: The party is banned by King Carol II

1944: The party resumed its activities

1944: A faction formed the ⇒ National Liberal Party-Tătărescu

1947: The party is banned by the communist regime

1990: The party is refounded by Radu Câmpeanu

1990: A youth faction of the National Liberal Party formed the ⇒ Liberal Party Youth Wing

1991: A faction formed the ⇒ National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention

1995: The ⇒ Liberal party 1993 merged into the National Liberal Party, the ⇒ National Liberal Party-Câmpeanu seceded from the party

1998: The party absorbed the ⇒ Civic Alliance Party

2002: The Alliance for Romania (Alianţa pentru România) merged into the National Liberal Party

2003: The Union of Right-Wing Forces (Uniunea Forţelor de Dreapta) and the ⇒ National Liberal Party-Câmpeanu merged into the party

National Liberal Party-Brătianu

1929: A faction of the ⇒ National Liberal Party formed the National Liberal Party-Brătianu (Partidul Naţional-Liberal-Brătianu)

1931: Most of the party returned to the National Liberal Party

1938: The party reunited with the National Liberal Party

National Liberal Party-Tătărescu

1944: A faction of the ⇒ National Liberal Party formed the National Liberal Party-Tătărescu (Partidul Naţional-Liberal (Tătărescu))

1945: The party ran in elections with the Romanian Communist Party

1947: The party is banned by the communist regime

National Liberal Party Youth Wing to Liberal Party 1993

1990: A youth faction of the ⇒ National Liberal Party formed the National Liberal Party Youth Wing (Partidul Naţional-Liberal Aripa Tînără)

1993: The Liberal Party merged with the ⇒ National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention and the Group for Moral and Political Reforms into the Liberal Party 1993 (Partidul Liberal 1993), joined by a faction of the ⇒ Civic Alliance Party

1998: The party merged into the ⇒ National Liberal Party

Civic Alliance Party

1991: A section of the Civic Alliance non-governmental organization established the Civic Alliance Party (Partidul Alianţa Civică), led by Nicolae Manolescu

1993: A faction joined the ⇒ Liberal Party 1993

1998: The party merged into the ⇒ National Liberal Party

National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention

1991: A faction of the ⇒ National Liberal Party formed the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention (Partidul Naţional-Liberal-Convenţia Democrată)

1993: A faction merged into the ⇒ Liberal Party 1993

1997: National Liberal Part-Democratic Convention merged with the Liberal Party 1993 into the=> Liberal Party

National Liberal Party-Câmpeanu

1995: A faction of the ⇒ National Liberal Party formed the National Liberal Party-Câmpeanu (Partidul Naţional-Liberal-Câmpeanu)

2003: The party merged into the ⇒ National Liberal Party



11/09 – 1799, 1918, 1923, 1938, 1989

1). 1799 – Napoleon Bonaparte leads the Coup d’état of 18 Brumaire ending the Directory government, and becoming one of its three Consuls (Consulate Government).

The coup of 18 Brumaire (often simply 18 Brumaire or Brumaire) was the coup d’état by which General Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the French Directory, replacing it with the French Consulate. This occurred on 9 November 1799, which was 18 Brumaire, Year VIII under the French Republican Calendar.

The name, already well-established in common usage, was reinforced by the title of Karl Marx‘sThe Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, 1852), an account of the 2 December 1851 coup by Napoleon’s nephew, which begins with the oft-quoted “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.”

The reasons for General Bonaparte’s coup may have lain more in his defeats than by his victories. In November 1799, France was suffering the effects of military reverses brought on by Bonaparte’s adventurism in the Middle East. The looming threat of opportunistic invasion by theSecond Coalition had provoked internal unrest, with Bonaparte stuck in Egypt.

The coup was first prepared not by Napoleon, but by the Abbé Sieyès, then one of the five Directors, attempting to head off a return toJacobinism. Dazzled by Napoleon’s victories in the East, the public ignored the impending calamitous ending of the Egyptian expedition. They received Napoleon with an ardor which convinced Sieyès he had found the general indispensable to his coup. However, from the moment of his return in September 1799, Napoleon plotted a coup within the coup, ultimately gaining power for himself rather than Sieyès.

Perhaps the gravest potential obstacles to a coup were in the army. Some generals, such as Jourdan, honestly believed in republicanism; others, such as Bernadotte, believed themselves capable of governing France. With perfect subtlety, Napoleon worked on the feelings of all, keeping secret his own intentions.

An army contractor named Collot advanced two million francs to finance the coup. There were troops conveniently deployed around Paris. The plan was, first, to persuade the Directors to resign, then, second, to get the Council of Ancients and the Council of Five Hundred (the upper and lower houses of the legislature) to appoint a pliant commission that would draw up a new constitution to the plotters’ specifications.

On the morning of 18 Brumaire, members of the Council of Ancients sympathetic to the coup warned their colleagues of a Jacobin conspiracy and persuaded them to remove to the Château de Saint-Cloud, west of Paris. General Bonaparte was charged with the safety of the two Councils. Later that morning Sieyès and Roger Ducos resigned as Directors. Talleyrand persuaded Barras to do the same (the troops in the garden outside were persuasive).

The resignation of three of the five Directors prevented a quorum and thus practically abolished the Directory, but the two Jacobin Directors,Gohier and Moulin, refused to resign. Gohier was taken prisoner and Moulin escaped. The two Councils were not yet intimidated and continued meeting.

By the following day, the deputies had, for the most part, realized that they were facing an attempted coup rather than being protected from a Jacobin rebellion. Faced with their recalcitrance, Napoleon stormed into the chambers, escorted by a small force of grenadiers. While perhaps unplanned, this proved to be the coup within the coup: from this point, this was a military affair.

Napoleon met with heckling as he addressed the Ancients with such “home truths” as, “the Republic has no government” and, most likely, “the Revolution is over.” One deputy called out, “And the Constitution?” Napoleon replied, referring to earlier parliamentary coups, “The Constitution! You yourselves have destroyed it. You violated it on 18 Fructidor; you violated it on 22 Floreal; you violated it on 30 Prairial. It no longer has the respect of anyone.”

Napoleon withdrew to the chateau’s Orangerie, where the Council of Five Hundred was meeting. His reception here was even more hostile. Napoleon and his grenadiers entered just as the legality of Barras’ resignation was being challenged by the Jacobins in the chamber. Upon entering, Napoleon was first jostled, then outright assaulted. Depending on whose account is accepted, he may or may not have come close to fainting. It was not Napoleon himself, but his brother Lucien, President of the Council, who called upon the grenadiers to defend their leader. Napoleon escaped, but only through the use of military force.

A motion was raised in the Council of Five Hundred to declare Napoleon an outlaw. At this point, Lucien Bonaparte apparently slipped out of the chamber and told the soldiers guarding the Councils that the majority of the Five Hundred were being terrorized by a group of deputies brandishing daggers. Then, according to Michael Rapport, “He pointed to Napoleon’s bloody, pallid face as proof. Then, in a theatrical gesture, he seized a sword and promised to plunge it through his own brother’s heart if he were a traitor.” Lucien ordered the troops to expel the violent deputies from the chamber. Grenadiers under the command of General Muratmarched into the Orangerie and dispersed the Council. This was effectively the end of the Directory.

The Ancients passed a decree which adjourned the Councils for three months, appointed Napoleon, Sieyès, and Ducos provisional consuls, and named the Legislative Commission. Some tractable members of the Five Hundred, rounded up afterwards, served to give these measures the confirmation of their House. Thus the Directory and the Councils came to an end.

The Directory was crushed, but the coup within the coup was not yet complete. The use of military force had certainly strengthened Napoleon’s hand vis à vis Sieyès and the other plotters. With the Council routed, the plotters convened two commissions, each consisting of twenty-five deputies from the two Councils. The plotters essentially intimidated the commissions into declaring a provisional government, the first form of the Consulate with Napoleon, Sieyès, and Ducos as Consuls. The lack of reaction from the streets proved that the revolution was, indeed, over. “A shabby compound of brute force and imposture, the 18th Brumaire was nevertheless condoned, nay applauded, by the French nation. Weary of revolution, men sought no more than to be wisely and firmly governed.” Resistance by Jacobin officeholders in the provinces was quickly crushed. Twenty Jacobin deputies were exiled, and others were arrested. The commissions then drew up the “short and obscure Constitution of the Year VIII” , the first of the constitutions since the Revolution without a Declaration of Rights.

Bonaparte thus completed his coup within a coup by the adoption of a constitution under which the First Consul, a position he was sure to hold, had greater power than the other two. In particular, he appointed the Senate and the Senate interpreted the constitution. The Senateallowed him to rule by decree, so the more independent State Council and Tribunate degenerated into impotence, serving merely as window dressing. It led ultimately to Empire.

2). 1918 – Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany abdicates after the German Revolution, and Germany is proclaimed a Republic.

The German Revolution (German: Novemberrevolution) was the politically-driven civil conflict in Germany at the end of World War I. The period lasted fromNovember 1918 until the formal establishment of the Weimar Republic in August 1919.

The roots of the revolution can be found in the social tensions of the German Empire, its undemocratic constitution and the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to reform. The revolution was triggered by the policy of the Supreme Command and the decision of the Naval Command in the face of defeat to deliver one last battle to the British Royal Navy. The sailor’s revolt which then ensued in the naval ports of Wilhelmshaven and Kiel spread across the whole country within days and led to the proclamation of a republic on 9 November 1918 and shortly thereafter to the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Further-reaching goals of the revolutionaries inspired by communist ideas failed because of the resistance of the Social Democratic Party of Germany leadership in January 1919. Fearing an all-out civil war they, in line with the middle-class parties, did not have in mind to completely strip the old imperial elites of their power. Instead they sought to reconcile them with the new democratic conditions. In this endeavour they sought an alliance with the Supreme Command and had the army and Freikorps (nationalist militias) quell the so-called Spartacist uprising by force.

3). In Munich, Germany, police and government troops crush the Beer Hall Putsch in Bavaria. The failed coup is the work of the Nazis.

The Beer Hall Putsch (also known as the Munich Putsch, but in German referred to as the Hitlerputsch or the Hitler-Ludendorff-Putsch) was a failed attempt at revolution that occurred between the evening of 8 November and the early afternoon of 9 November 1923, when Nazi Party leader Adolf HitlerGeneralquartiermeister Erich Ludendorff, and other heads of the Kampfbund unsuccessfully tried to seize power in Munich,Bavaria, and GermanyPutsch is the German word for coup d’état.

4). KristallnachtNazi Germany‘s first large-scale physical act of anti-Jewish violence, begins. Kristallnacht (German pronunciation: [kʁɪsˈtalˌnaxt]; literally “Crystal night”) or the Night of Broken Glass was an anti-Jewish pogrom in Nazi Germany and Austria on 9 to 10 November 1938. It is also known as NovemberpogromeReichskristallnachtReichspogromnacht or Pogromnacht in German.

Kristallnacht was triggered by the assassination of German diplomat Ernst vom Rath by Herschel Grynszpan, a German-born Polish Jew. In a coordinated attack on Jewish people and their property, 99 Jews were murdered and 25,000 to 30,000 were arrested and placed in concentration camps. 267 synagogues were destroyed and thousands of homes and businesses were ransacked. This was done by the Hitler YouthGestapoSS and SA. Kristallnacht also served as a pretext and a means for the wholesale confiscation of firearms from German Jews.

While the assassination of Rath served as a pretext for the attacks, Kristallnacht was part of a broader Nazi policy of antisemitism and persecution of the Jews, was followed by further economic and political persecutions and is viewed by many historians as the beginning of the Final Solution, leading towards the genocide of the Holocaust.

5). 1989 Fall of the Berlin WallCommunist-controlled East Germany opens checkpoints in the Berlin Wall allowing its citizens to travel to West Germany. People start demolishing the Berlin Wall.

During a revolutionary wave sweeping across the Eastern Bloc, the East German government announced on November 9, 1989, after several weeks of civil unrest, that all GDR citizens could visit West Germany and West Berlin. Crowds of East Germans climbed onto and crossed the wall, joined by West Germans on the other side in a celebratory atmosphere. Over the next few weeks, parts of the wall were chipped away by a euphoric public and by souvenir hunters; industrial equipment was later used to remove almost all of the rest. The fall of the Berlin Wall paved the way forGerman reunification, which was formally concluded on October 3, 1990.

Hungarian Revolution 1956

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (Hungarian: 1956-os forradalom) was a spontaneous nationwide revolt against the Stalinist government of the People’s Republic of Hungary and its Soviet-imposed policies, lasting from 23 October until 10 November 1956.

The revolt began as a student demonstration which attracted thousands as it marched through central Budapest to the Parliament building. A student delegation entering theradio building in an attempt to broadcast its demands was detained. When the delegation’s release was demanded by the demonstrators outside, they were fired upon by the State Security Police (ÁVH) from within the building. The news spread quickly and disorder and violence erupted throughout the capital.

The revolt spread quickly across Hungary, and the government fell. Thousands organized into militias, battling the State Security Police (ÁVH) and Soviet troops. Pro-Soviet communists and ÁVH members were often executed or imprisoned, as former prisoners were released and armed. Impromptu councils wrested municipal control from the ruling Hungarian Working People’s Party and demanded political changes. The new government formally disbanded the ÁVH, declared its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and pledged to re-establish free elections. By the end of October, fighting had almost stopped and a sense of normality began to return.

After announcing a willingness to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet forces, the Politburochanged its mind and moved to crush the revolution. On 4 November, a large Soviet force invaded Budapest and other regions of the country. Hungarian resistance continued until 10 November. Over 2,500 Hungarians and 700 Soviet troops were killed in the conflict, and 200,000 Hungarians fled as refugees. Mass arrests and denunciations continued for months thereafter.

Alexander Parvus

Alexander Parvus, Russian revolutionary (Menshevik) and a German Social Democrat, as well as a German intelligence agent.

In December of 1905 Parvus authored a provocative article on behalf of the St. Petersburg Soviet, The Financial Manifesto, which described the Russian economy as being on the verge of collapse. In turn the article was dispatched to other communist agents in the more mainline newspapers who published it as well. In combination with this propaganda, Parvus coordinated an agitation of locals to feign a run on the banks. As the news of the article and the subsequent “rush” was spread, the consequent hysteria managed to upset the economy and enrage prime minister Sergei Witte, but did not cause a financial collapse. In connection with this provocation and Parvus’ involvement in the organization of anti-government actions during the 1905 revolution, Parvus (together with other revolutionaries such as Leon Trotsky) was arrested by the Russian police. While in prison he became close with other revolutionaries, and was visited by Rosa Luxemburg. Sentenced to three years exile in Siberia, Parvus escaped and ran away to Germany.

While in Turkey, Parvus became close with German ambassador Baron Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim who was known to be partial to establishing revolutionary fifth columns among the allies. Consequently, Parvus offered his plan via Baron von Wangenheim to the German General Staff: the paralyzing of Russia via general strike, financed by the German government. Von Wagenheim sent Parvus to Berlin where the latter arrived on the 6th of March, 1915 and presented a 20 page plan titled A preparation of massive political strikes in Russia to the German government. Parvus’ detailed plan recommended the division of Russia by sponsoring the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Basing himself on his 1905 experiences, Parvus theorised that the division of Russia and its loss in the First World War was the best way to bring about a socialist revolution.

Parvus placed his bets on Lenin, as the latter was not only a radical but willing to accept the sponsorship of the Tsar’s wartime enemy, Germany. The two met in Berne in May 1915 and agreed to collaboration through their organizations, though Lenin remained very careful never to get associated with Parvus in public. There is no certain proof that they ever met face to face again, although there are indications that such a meeting may well have occurred on April 13, 1917 during Lenin’s stop-over in Stockholm.

German intelligence set up Parvus’ financial network via offshore operations in Copenhagen, setting up relays for German money to get to Russia via fake financial transactions between front organizations. A large part of the transactions of these companies were genuine, but those served to bury the transfer of money to the Bolsheviks, a strategy made feasible by the weak and overburdened fiscal and customs offices in Scandinavia, which were inadequate for the booming black market in these countries during the war.

The most notorious was the Institute for the Study of the Social Consequences of War which Parvus set up in Denmark. Initially he had intended for Nikolai Bukharin to lead the operation, but under the pressure of Lenin who mistrusted Bukharin as a probable government agent instead instituted Lenin’s confidants Yakov Ganetsky and Karl Radek. The activities of agent couriers were organized by Moisei Uritsky, later the head of Soviet Petrograd’s Cheka.

Parvus’ reputation with the German ministry of foreign affairs came into question when in the winter of 1916 a Parvus planned financial catastrophe in St. Petersburg (akin to Parvus’ provocation against the Russian banks in 1905) failed to produce a massive uprising. As a result, financing for Parvus’ operations were frozen. Parvus went for support to the German Navy, briefly working as their advisor. He managed to help prevent Russian naval admiral Kolchak from taking on his offensive against the Turko-German Fleet in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by planning the sabotage of a major Russian warship. This success gave him more credibility, once again, in the eyes of the Germans.

In March 1917, in a plan strategized together with Parvus, German intelligence sent Vladimir Lenin and a group of 30 of his revolutionary associates from Switzerland through Germany in a train car under supervision of Swiss socialist Fritz Platten.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.